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MIDNIGHT WELFARE SEARCHES AND THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT
CHARLES A. REICHt
IN many states, and in the District of Columbia, it has become common prac-
tice for authorities to make unannounced inspections of the homes of persons
receiving public assistance. Often such searches are made without warrants and
in the middle of the night. The purpose of the inspections is to check on
recipients' eligibility for assistance. Eligibility, under state or local law, may be
determined by many aspects of a family's circumstances, including the presence
or absence of an adult man capable of supporting the family. The searches are
sometimes based upon particular evidence known to investigators beforehand,
but on occasion there have been mass raids designed as general checks on
eligibility. The demand for entry may carry with it the threat, express or im-
plied, that refusal to admit will lead to discontinuance of public assistance.
Under the Social Security Act,' the federal government participates to a sub-
stantial degree in state public assistance programs. The Act sets forth detailed
requirements that state plans must meet to qualify for payment of federal funds
and provides for approval of state plans by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare.2 Nothing in the Act deals explicitly with the matter of searches.
But the widespread use of midnight searches in the administration of welfare
programs which are federally supported nevertheless presents a problem of na-
tional concern. This concern must be all the greater because persons on welfare
are mostly unable to protect their own rights, and because the searches have
become an integral part of an otherwise beneficent program that is central to the
welfare state.
I. WELFARE SEARCHES AND THE CONSTITUTION
The first question that must be asked is whether midnight inspections are
consistent with the federal Constitution. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The rights guaranteed by this amendment are enforceable against the federal
government and, through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, against the states.3
-Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. This article is based on a memorandum
prepared for the Field Foundation.
1. 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1371 (1958).
2. See, e.g., 49 Stat. 627, 629, 631 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02, 701-03,
711-13 (1958).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Do searches of welfare recipients' homes without warrants violate the fourth
and fourteenth amendments? They might be justified, if at all, only by one of
these general arguments: (a) that the searches are conducted with the consent,
express or implied, of the recipients; (b) that the object of the searches is not
to secure evidence for criminal prosecution or forfeiture; (c) that the searches,
under all the circumstances, are reasonable. These issues will be discussed be-
low.
A. Consent
An entry or search that might appear to be a violation of constitutional
rights may be validated by consent, express or implied. Welfare inspectors do
not force their way in; they enter only when the occupant opens the door.
Our first problem is whether this form of acquiescence in a search constitutes
"consent."
Two leading decisions of the Supreme Court deal with the question of
acquiescence to a search. In Johnson v. United States,4 the occupant of a room
opened the door after the police knocked and said they wanted to talk to her.
The Court held that the occupant had not freely consented to the officers' entry
and subsequent search:
Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of the search,
was demanded under color of office. It was granted in submission to au-
thority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a con-
stitutional right. 5
In Amos v. United States,6 officers went to a home and told the woman who
answered the door that they were revenue officers come to search the premises,
whereupon she admitted them. The Court ruled:
The contention that the constitutional rights of defendant were waived
when his wife admitted to his home the Government officers, who came,
without warrant, demanding admission to make search of it under Govern-
ment authority, cannot be entertained. We need not consider whether it is
possible for a wife, in the absence of her husband, thus to waive his con-
stitutional rights, for it is perfectly clear that under the implied coercion
here presented, no such waiver was intended or effected.7
Thus the mere demand for admission by one in authority is likely to be c(n-
sidered as coercive.8 The courts are quick to note the "disparity of position"
between a government agent and a "humble" ordinary citizen., In light of these
4. 333 U.S. 10 (1948),
5. Id. at 13.
6. 225 U.S. 313 (1921).
7. Id. at 317.
8. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
9. Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Nelson v, United
States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1953), ccrt. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953) ; Ray v. United
States, 84 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1936).
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cases, it seems clear that the opening of a door by a welfare recipient, in re-
sponse to a demand by official investigators, is not consent to a search.20
The conclusion that consent is not present in a typical welfare search has
been reached without assuming the existence of any pressure on the occupants
other than that generated by the mere presence of authority. In reality, there
is often a threat, sometimes made explicitly, and sometimes merely present in
the mind of the recipient, that unless inspectors are admitted public assistance
will be taken away. This fact greatly strengthens the conclusion that there is
no freely given consent. In a recent case involving a coerced confession, the
Supreme Court held that the threat that "state financial aid for her infant chil-
dren would be cut off . . ." constituted an important element of coercion.1
This case leaves little doubt that the Court would deem even an implied threat
to cut off assistance as coercive in a welfare search situation.
If there is no voluntary consent, is there any ground for contending that
recipients of public assistance impliedly consent to inspections when they accept
assistance? The Supreme Court has held that in special circumstances, where
a citizen is required by law to keep certain records, the citizen may be held to
have accepted the obligation to permit them to be inspected. 12 However, the
theory of such cases is that the citizen has in his possession property that does
not belong to him-property that is public, not private. NVelfare recipients are
not required to keep any comparable records, and there is nothing else in their
10. The status of the law on. this point has been well summarized by Judge Washington
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
Searches and seizures made without a proper %%-arrant are generally to be regarded
as unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. True, the obtaining of the
warrant may on occasion, be waived by the individual; he may give his consent to
the search and seizure. But such a waiver or consent must be proved by clear and
positive testimony, and, it must be established that there was no duress or coercion,
actual or implied. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41. S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654;
United States v. Kelih D.C.S.D. Ill. 1921, 272 F. 484. The Government must show
a consent that is "unequivocal and specific' (Karwicki v. United States, 4 Cir. 55
F.2d 225, 226), "freely and intelligently given." Kovach v. United States, 6 Cir., 53
F.2d 639. Thus "invitations" to enter one's house, extended to armed officers of the
law who demand entrance, are usually to be considered as invitations secured by force.
United, States v. Marquette, D.C.N.D. Cal. 1920, 271 F. 120. A like view has been
taken where an officer displays his badge and, declares that he has come to make a
search (United States v. Slusser, D.C.S.D. Ohio 1921, 270 F. 818), even where the
householder replies "All right." United States v. Marra, D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1930, 40
F.2d 271. A finding of consent in such circumstances has been held to be "unfounded
in reasom" Herter v. United States, 9 Cir., 27 F.2d 521. Intimidation and duress are
almost necessarily implicit in such situations; if the Government alleges their ab-
sence, it has the burden of convincing the court that they are in fact absent.
Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
11. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
12. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1948) ; Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 587-91 (1946) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). See also Bowles
v. Glick Bros. Lumber Co., 146 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. dcnicd, 325 U.S. 842 1945;
Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1943).
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homes that could possibly be deemed public property justifying an inspection.
Even under the public records doctrine inspection must be carried on in a rea-
sonable manner. The Supreme Court, in upholding inspection of public records
held by a private individual, stressed that the inspection took place at "a place
of business, not a private residence," and that it occurred "during business
hours."'13 The Court added:
We do not suggest that officers seeking to reclaim government property
may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor do we suggest that
the right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general
search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons
subject to inspection and seizure.' 4
In summary, there is no theory under which it can be said that public as-
sistance recipients consent, expressly or impliedly, to searches of their homes.
The official demand for entrance is sufficient to render any apparent consent
involuntary and the threat of loss of public assistance underscores the coercive
nature of the demand for entry.
B. The Object of the Search
Does the object or purpose of a search affect its validity under the fourth
amendment? It has been argued that there is a significant difference between
a search for evidence of crime and an inspection to check on eligibility for a
government benefit.
In Frank v. Maryland,'5 the Supreme Court had before it a city ordinance
authorizing health inspectors to inspect homes for unsanitary conditions with-
out a warrant, and subjecting householders to a fine for refusal to admit all
inspector. In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the law. Its reasons were
as follows: (a) the inspection was solely for remedial health purposes; no evi-
dence for criminal prosecution or forfeiture was sought; (b) under the ordi-
nance, valid grounds for suspicion were required to exist; (c) the inspection
was required to be made in the daytime. The Court said: "Here was no mid-
night knock on the door, but an orderly visit in the middle of the afternoon,
with no suggestion that the hour was inconvenient" ;16 (d) the inspector had
no power to force entry; (e) such inspection had a long history. The Court
upheld that statute because it touched "at most upon the periphery of the
important interests safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment's protection
against official intrusion," and because "it is hedged about with safeguards de-
signed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant, and to
cause only the slightest restriction on his claims of privacy."' 1
This decision is the chief argument in support of permitting some kinds of
13. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 592 (1946).
14. Id. at 591.
15. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
16. Id. at 366.
17. Id. at 367.
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"non-criminal" inspections without warrants.18 But the carefully guarded lan-
guage of the opinion indicates that the holding would not be extended to apply
to welfare searches. They lack the safeguards that the Court mentioned. Instead,
welfare searches are frequently the very "midnight knock on the door" which
the Frank case condemned. It would require a significant extension of Frank
to permit the welfare searches.
Rather than being extended, the prospect is that the Frank case will be
limited and that judicial protection of privacy will increase. The four dissenting
justices in Frank, all of whom are still serving, contended that the inspection
violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments despite its noncriminal pur-
pose and its safeguards. They said that no government official can invade a
home for any reason unless he has a warrant or an immediate major crisis
affords neither time nor opportunity to get a warrant.10 Recent decisions of the
Court show it to be moving toward a more sweeping, rather than narrower,
interpretation of the right of privacy.
-0
The above comparison of welfare inspections with health inspections has as-
sumed that the welfare inspections are not searches for evidence of crime. But
this assumption itself must be questioned. The purpose of searching recipients'
homes is, as already stated, to check on their eligibility. But under state public
assistance laws, misrepresentation of eligibility may generally be prosecuted as
a crime. For example, Section 145 of the New York Social Welfare Law makes
it a misdemeanor to obtain public assistance to which one is not entitled, and
specifies that failure to notify the appropriate welfare official of any receipt of
income shall constitute presumptive evidence of deliberate concealment of a
material fact. Moreover, under this statute welfare officials must report apparent
violations to the district attorney. In Washington, D.C. misrepresentation may
also be punished as a crime under Section 32-765 of the District of Columbia
Code. In California a false application for aid to a child constitutes the crime
of perjury.21 In addition, the unlawful taking of welfare payments, based upon
misrepresentation of eligibility, has been held to constitute the crime of grand
theft 22 In New York, it would also constitute grand larceny.2- In Pennsylvania
it would be cheating by false pretense.2
18. In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Frank, 4-4, and in the view of the dissenters, applied it to a different factual situation. How-
ever, the majority wrote no opinion, indicating that no extension of Frank %%-as intended.
Cf. Abel v. United, States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), also involving a "non-criminal" search;
but in that case the search was upheld solely on, the ground that it was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
19. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374. See also District of Columbia v, Little, 178
F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd on othcr grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), for a strong statement
by Judge Prettyman that the fourth amendment applies equally to non-criminal searches.
20. Wong Sum v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
21. CAJ. WELFARE & INSTITUTIONs CODE § 1550 (1956).
22. Dawson v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 2d 685, 292 P.2d 574 (1956).
23. People v. Hubbard, 10 App. Div. 2d 735, 199 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1960).
24. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 166 Pa. Super. 214, 70 A2d 458 (1950).
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Even more significant for the present discussion is the fact that searches by
welfare inspectors have actually led to criminal prosecutions under the laws
just cited. For example, in People v. Shirley,25 defendant, Tressie Neal, re-
ceived welfare aid for herself and her minor children. She reported to a county
social worker that her only income was her welfare payments plus occasional
earnings of the children, and that there were no unrelated adults living with
the family. The social worker visited her home one day and found a man there,
fully clothed but wearing bedroom slippers. Two days later, investigators came
to the house at 2:30 A.M. and found the man in bed in defendant's bedroom.
She then admitted that he had been living there for at least six months and that
he had contributed to her support. She was found guilty of the crime of grand
theft.
In People v. Phipps,26 a woman obtained welfare payments for herself and
her nine minor children after stating that her husband was absent from home
and that she was seeking a divorce. After accumulating considerable evidence
that the husband was actually living at home, investigators paid a nocturnal
call, described by the court as follows:
Between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on January 28, 1959, investigators went to
the Phipps home to investigate the truth of reports that Mr. Phipps was
frequenting the home of Mrs. Phipps. The call was made at that unusual
hour to preclude the anticipated explanation that Mr. Phipps was at the
home for the purpose of visiting his children. As the investigators ap-
proached the home they encountered Mr. Phipps as he came out the back
door. Mrs. Phipps and several of the children were inside the home. Both
Mr. and Mrs. Phipps were fully dressed. She stated that Mr. Phipps had
spent the evening there and they were still visiting and awaiting the return
of a teenaged daughter who had gone out to attend a dance.27
Primarily on the basis of a subsequent admission, but also on the basis of the
evidence thus obtained, husband and wife were convicted of grand theft.
In Blackmone v. United States,28 Elizabeth Blackmone obtained welfare pay-
ments after representing that her husband had deserted her. The following
excerpts from the court's opinion are relevant:
On the evening of February 7, 1958, three investigators of the Department
of Public Welfare went to the house occupied by Mrs. Blackmone. Two of
them went to the rear of the premises, and after a short wait, they observed
a man running from the rear door in his bare feet and shirt sleeves. The
investigators asked him where he was going and requested him to go back
into the house with them, which, according to the statement of proceedings
and evidence, he did "voluntarily." Inside, they found Mrs. Blackmone
and the third investigator, who testified that he had been "admitted" to
the premises by Mrs. Blackmone. After some discussion, she stated that
the man was her husband. Blackmone then said:
25. 55 Cal. 2d 521, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537, 360 P.2d 33 (1961).
26. 191 Cal. App. 2d 448, 12 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
27. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 452, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
28. 151 A.2d 191 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959).
1352 [Vol. 72:1341
MIDNIGHT WELFARE SEARCHES
Well, you've got me boys. My name is Blackmone .... I'm here, you
can see. I've been here off and on about three years.
While in the house the investigators noticed men's clothing.9
Husband and wife were convicted, on the basis of this and other evidence, of
the crime of welfare fraud.
Other cases, not themselves involving inspection, show the importance to
criminal prosecutions of evidence that might possibly be obtained by searches
of recipients' homes. In People v. Bailey,30 the court held that where a man
lives with the mother of welfare-aided children, the Department of Social Wel-
fare has the right to treat him as if he were the children's stepfather and to
compute eligibility by considering his income. The defendant mother was con-
victed of grand theft. In People v. Ryerson,3' a husband and wife were con-
victed of obtaining welfare money by false pretenses because they represented
that they had separated while actually continuing marital relations. In People
v. Hubbard,32 a charge of grand larceny was based on misrepresentation of
marital status to the Department of Welfare.3
It should be added that even the narrowest interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment applies it to evidence for forfeitures as well as crimes.3 ' A search for
evidence to cancel welfare benefits might well be deemed to be a proceeding for
forfeiture.35 While this term as used in the early search and seizure cases un-
doubtedly meant the confiscation of private property as a penalty for violation
of law,3 6 deprivation of welfare subsistence could be considered the modem
equivalent of a forfeiture.
C. Reasonableness of Search
The only remaining argument to support welfare searches is the very general
one that they can somehow be justified as "reasonable." The Supreme Court
has said: "[I]t is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within
the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid
and absolute terms. 'Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circum-
stances....
In the two leading cases in which this statement was made, searches without
29. Id. at 194.
30. 55 Cal. 2d 514, 360 P.2d 39, 11 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1961).
31. 199 Cal. App. 2d 646, 19 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
32. 10 App. Div. 2d 235, 199 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1960).
33. In addition to evidence of the crimes described above, searches of recipients' homes
might furnish evidence of closely related crimes, such as adultery or fornication Section 405
of the Social Security Act also recognizes that states may impose criminal penalties based
upon misuse of funds provided for the benefit of a child. 76 Stat. 188 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 605
(1962 Supp.).
34. Frank v. Maryland, supra note 16, at 365.
35. But cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
36. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
37. Harris v. United, States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); United States v. Rabinowvitz,
339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
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warrants were held valid. But in both cases the searches were incident to lawful
arrests, a circumstance which the Court recognizes as a special exception to the
general rules governing searches and seizures and which is not present in the
ordinary welfare search.
With respect to the reasonableness of a search of a private dwelling, not sup-
ported by a lawful arrest, the Supreme Court first stated its position in Agncllo
v. United States:3
s
While the question has never been directly decided by this court, it has
always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without
a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein .... The
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all equally,-to those just-
ly suspected or accused, as well as to the innocent. The search of a private
dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our
laws .... Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed
in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause.39
This case is the first of a series in which the Court expressed the view that a
private dwelling has a special sanctity. In the case of a home, even if officers
have good reason to believe they will find evidence of wrongdoing, it is un-
reasonable per se for them to enter without first obtaining a warrant. The
Court adhered to this strict view in Taylor v. United States.40
In Johnson v. United States,41 the Court had before it a case which on its
facts was remarkably similar to the nocturnal calls of welfare investigators.
At about 7:30 p.m. an officer of the Seattle police force received information
from an informant that persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. The
police and narcotics agents, arriving at the hotel, recognized the smell of burn-
ing opium, which led them to Room 1. They knocked, identified themselves as
officers, demanded entry, and were admitted. The Supreme Court held that
while the search would have been justifiable if made upon a warrant obtained
from a judge, since it was in fact made without a warrant it violated the fourth
amendment.42
In the recent case of Chapman v. United States,4" the Court explicitly re-
affirmed the views expressed in Agnello, Taylor and Johnson. It then went
further and declared that a rented dwelling has the same protection as one that
38. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
39. Id. at 32-33.
40. 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
41. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
42. Crime, even in, the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to
society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right
of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and free-
dom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right
of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or gov-
ernment enforcement agent. Id., at 14.
43. 365 U.S. 610, 613 (1961).
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is owned, even if the landlord consents to the officers' search of the tenant's
quarters.
The authorities discussed show that inspecting the homes of persons receiv-
ing public assistance without warrants is, regardless of variations in circum-
stances, unreasonable and therefore illegal and unconstitutional. Plainly, no
arguments based on necessity to enforce the welfare laws will justify the search
without warrants of the homes of welfare recipients. Nor will any amount of
information showing the likelihood of violation. On this question, the Supreme
Court has been so clear and consistent that further citation of authorities is
unnecessary. In sum, midnight welfare searches, as commonly practiced, are a
flagrant violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
If the practice of searching the homes of public assistance recipients is un-
constitutional, why has it continued so long? A major reason is that persons on
public assistance are in no position to enforce a constitutional right of privacy.
They lack the means and knowledge to litigate constitutional questions. And
the available legal remedies are most inadequate. Until 1961 there was, for all
practical purposes, no remedy whatever that could be invoked by a private in-
dividual whose home had been invaded in violation of the federal Constitution.
Since Mapp v. Ohio,4 evidence obtained as the result of such an invasion has
been inadmissible in a subsequent state criminal trial, and it might also be held
inadmissible in a hearing to revoke eligibility for welfare. But these remedies
are strictly after-the-fact; they do not bar the searches. The only way to bar the
searches is to refuse to admit the investigators, and in the present state of the
law that means risking the loss of subsistence for the family.
These circumstances bring into sharp focus the question of national respon-
sibility for the administration of those state programs which receive federal aid
under the Social Security Act. Are midnight searches compatible with the Act?
And does the Department of Health, Education and Welfare have any power
or responsibility with respect to such searches? In the absence of other effec-
tive means to enforce the constitutional rights of a large group of the poor and
the ignorant, these questions are urgent.
A. Are Illegal Searches Compatible with the Act?
The Social Security Act provides for federal-state cooperation in welfare
programs. The programs are established and administered by state legislatures
and state executives. To encourage the establishment of such programs, the
federal government offers substantial financial assistance, both for subsistence
payments and for administrative expense. To qualify for receipt of these federal
funds, however, the state programs must conform to specified federal standards
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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stated in the Act. Interpretation of these standards, and application of them to
state legislation, case-law, and administrative practice is the responsibility of
the Secretary of the Department to which the particular program has been as-
signed-in the case of Dependent Child and similar benefits, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. On the basis of his periodic certification to
the Secretary of the Treasury that a state program is or continues to be in con-
formity with the federal standards, payments of federal funds are made. If he
finds a lack of or departure from conformity, they may be withheld.46 It is
uncertain whether his determinations are subject to judicial review. 40
The standards set by Congress include matters of procedure and adminis-
tration. For example, the federal program of grants to states for aid and service
to needy children contains detailed provisions as to how a state plan must be
administered, including a requirement of fair hearings on denial of applica-
tions,47 and safeguards for keeping confidential all information concerning ap-
plicants.48 It is therefore clear that Congress has asserted the power to con-
trol at least some aspects of the administration of state plans, and that Congress
has in fact concerned itself with questions of state procedure and administra-
tion. Against this background, the issue is whether the constitutional prohibi-
tion against searching homes must be recognized as one of the federal standards
to which state plans must conform.
The Social Security Act itself does not contain any provisions with respect
to search and seizure. This is not surprising; there is nothing about the Social
Security Act, as distinguished from many other federal statutes, which would
suggest that search and seizure problems might arise under it. But Congress has
enacted legislation with respect to searching private homes in connection with
the enforcement or administration of any federal statute. Section 2236 of Title
18, U.S.C. provides:
Section 2236. Searches without warrant.
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or
any department or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law
of the United States, searches any private dwelling used and occupied as
such dwelling without a warrant directing such search, or maliciously and
without reasonable cause searches any other building or property wthoat
a search warrant, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $1,000;
and, for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both.... .*
This statute is unquestionably binding on the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare and all of its employees. It also applies to all persons acting
as "agents" of the United States, including officers of the District of Columbia.
45. 49 Stat. 628 (1935), 42 U.S.C. §§ 603-04 (1958).
46. See Arizona ex rel. State Board of Public Welfare v. I-lobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); Indiana ex rel. State Board of Public Welfare v. Ewing, 99 F. Supp, 734
(D.D.C. 1951), vacated as moot, 195 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1958).
48. 53 Stat. 1380 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (1958).
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While it is doubtful that a state officer enforcing a federal-state program is an
"agent" of the United States, the spirit of the statute is a broad one.
40
The fact that Congress dealt explicitly with the search of dwellings is of
special significance. The protections of the fourth amendment include many
matters other than the search of dwellings; arrests, seizures, and searches of
places other than homes are covered. But Congress deemed the privacy of
homes to be of such importance that it singled out the practice of searching
dwellings to declare affirmatively that the enforcement of federal law by use of
this practice is a criminal offense.
Congress has sought to ensure that no state welfare program be approved
under the Social Security Act unless it meets Congress' standards. It requires
little by way of implication to read the Act so as to include, among essential
federal standards, a congressional policy against searching dwellings that is so
specific in its object and so broad in its applicability. Certainly if a state pro-
gram expressly listed searches of dwellings among its provisions for adminis-
tration, it would be highly incongruous to hold such a program to be in com-
pliance with federal standards.
But even if Congress had enacted no statutes dealing with searches by pub-
lic officials, the Constitution sets its own standards for the administration of
federally assisted programs. For example, Congress could not assist a state
welfare plan which was administered so as to discriminate against persons be-
cause of their race or religion.50 Government funds may not be spent in a way
that discriminates in violation of the Constitution.r' This principle has been as-
serted in a recent Department of Health, Education and Welfare memorandum
holding that a provision of Michigan law limiting benefits available to depend-
ent child beneficiaries was inconsistent with federal standards under the Actr.
The principle is not limited to violation of the Constitution by discrimination.
It is equally plain, for example, that the federal government could not spend its
money in support of a program that violated the first amendment. The under-
lying proposition is that Congress may not apply public funds to any plan or
program that violates any of the provisions of the Constitution.
49. State officials are subject to an, entirely separate federal statute prohibiting them,
subject to federal penalty, from enforcing any law, state or federal, by means that deprive
people of their constitutional rights. This is the old Civil Rights Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1958), and at a minimum it shows congressional concern that state officials enforce their
laws 'only by constitutional means.
50. This was recognized by Judge Schweinhaut in Arizona ex rel. State Board of
Public Welfare v. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Social Security Act, Civil No.
2008-52, D.D.C., 1952, aff'd as modificd sub norn., Arizona cx rel. State Board of Public
Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
51. E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
52. Memorandum by Alanson V. WilIco., General Counsel of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, entitled "Memorandum Concerning Authority of the
Secretary, under title IV of the Social Security Act, to Disapprove Michigan House Bill
145 on the Ground of its Limitations on Eligibility." (March 25, 1963). See also the state-
ment of Secretary Celebrezze on, this same subject, dated March 26, 1963.
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B. The Department's Responsibility
In light of this principle, and in light of congressional policy on searches of
dwellings, what is the power, and the responsibility, of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare with respect to a state welfare program administered
by illegal inspections of recipients' homes? This question involves the Secre-
tary's power to issue regulations governing federally supported state programs,
or to disapprove programs that, in his judgment, do not conform to federal
standards.
The Secretary has general power to issue regulations under Section 1102 of
the Social Security Act.53 With respect to state plans for aid to dependent chil-
dren, his power is very specific; a state must "provide such methods of ad-
ministration ... as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper
and efficient operation of the plan. ' 54 The word "proper" should be emphasized.
In at least two instances the Secretary has recognized and exercised the power
to disapprove state plans on grounds not explicitly set forth in the Social Secu-
rity Act. He disapproved plans which deny aid to needy children on the basis
of a "suitable home" eligibility condition,5" and he rejected Michigan House
Bill 145 because of arbitrary discrimination in its plan of eligibility.60
These powers and precedents seem ample to support a ruling or regulation
by the Secretary barring the practice of administering state plans by unconsti-
tutional searches of recipients' homes. In the case of the "suitable home" re-
quirements, cited above,57 the Secretary disapproved the state programs be-
cause they imposed "a condition of eligibility that bears no just relationship to
the Aid for Dependent Children program."5' 8 For authority the Secretary had
only the general purposes of Title IV of the Social Security Act, and the gen-
eral principle that it would be unjust to withdraw aid from children because of
the nature of the home in which they live. But the Secretary found that, despite
the absence of more specific statutory authority, he was responsible to see that
federal grants were made only with respect to state programs that carried out
the general purposes of the Act. In the case of Michigan House Bill 145, also
cited above, the Secretary reasserted the authority to disapprove programs on
general grounds, and the general counsel said that the Secretary could unques-
tionably disapprove a program which appeared unconstitutional. He said: "It
would appear self-evident that the Secretary might properly disapprove a state
plan so discriminatory as to be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
53. 49 Stat. 647 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
54. 53 Stat. 1379 (1939), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (5) (1958).
55. Memorandum for The Commissioner of Social Security from Secretary Flemming,
January 16, 1961.
56. Statement of Secretary Celebrezze, March 26, 1963 (disapproving Michigan Ilouse
Bill 145 because of arbitrary discrimination).
57. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1958).
58. Memorandum for The Commissioner of Social Security from Secretary Flemminig,
supra note 57, at 2.
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ment."59 It follows that the Secretary can also disapprove a plan that is uncon-
stitutional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
If the Secretary has the power, what is his responsibility and duty? The
Supreme Court has suggested an answer in an analogous situation. A state
provided financial aid to a private restaurant. It had the power to prohibit racial
discrimination by the restaurant as a condition of supplying the assistance, but
it failed to exercise this power. The Court said, in words that apply forcefully
to the Department of Health, Educattion and Welfare in the present situation:
As the Chancellor pointed out, in its lease with Eagle the Authority could
have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under
the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a con-
sequence of state participation. But no State may effectively abdicate its
responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
them whatever the motive may be.... By its inaction, the Authority, and
through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of ser-
vice, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination.60
Thus if the Secretary permits federal funds to be dispensed to states which
use administrative methods that violate the Constitution, he permits the "power,
property and prestige" of the federal government to support such practices-
practices which cannot effectively be contested by the unfortunate victims. In
such circumstances, the Secretary's duty to exercise his power by prohibiting
the unconstitutional practices seems both plain and unavoidable. Here, as in the
case of racial discrimination, there is evidence of the increasing need for gov-
ernment to intervene affirmatively if rights guaranteed by the Constitution are
to be secured in fact.
III. A FURTHER QUESTION
Social security and public assistance are the heart of the welfare state. They
recognize that in a complex industrial society individuals cannot always be
"blamed" for inability to support thenselves, and that responsibility for in-
dividual subsistence must be widely shared. But must the price of state support
be the erosion of self-respect, and individual rights against government?
Welfare implies dependence. And dependence means that people may more
easily be induced to part with rights which they would ordinarily defend. A not
uncommon psychology leads those who dispense welfare to feel it only just that
the beneficiaries give up something in return. To some public officials, opening
one's home to inspection evidently seems a reasonable condition to impose on
those whose homes are supported by a public agency. In many other ways,
subtle and obvious, the recipients of public bounty are made to pay a similar
price. They may be asked to observe standards of morality not imposed on the
rest of the community. They may be forced to endure official condescension
and prying.
59. Statement of Secretary Celebrezze, supra note 56, at 2 n.1.
60. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
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If the welfare state is to be faithful to American traditions, government must
recognize its duty, even as it hands out benefits, to preserve the independence
of those it helps. In a complex society, individual rights are as much a com-
munity responsibility as food and clothing.
It is most unfortunate that the Social Security Act should have become a
means, however indirect, for depriving some persons of the privacy guaranteed
by the fourth amendment. The chief object of the amendment was to protect
the home and, thereby, the integrity of every individual. The object of the So-
cial Security Act was also to protect the home, and to protect independence
and self-respect. It undoes the most fundamental purpose of the Act if it is
enforced by methods that violate the sanctity of the home and degrade and
humiliate recipients. To insist that welfare officials obey the fourth amendment
is no more than to insist that the high aim of the Social Security Act not be
forgotten in the day-to-day difficulties of carrying it out; and to make certain
that the Act remains what it was, above all, intended to be-a guardian and
insurer of the dignity of man.
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